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Case Study Research is a landmark book. This culmina-
tion of years of careful thought by John Gerring is by far the
best dissection of case studies in the literature, in several ways.
First, it is the most comprehensive discussion. It looks at case
studies from every possible angle, and in a penetrating way
that exposes the term “case study” as a handy label for what is
actually a great variety of methods. It also examines case stud-
ies broadly, going beyond political science to describe vari-
ants of case studies that are done in economics, psychology,
and medicine. The breadth of Gerring’s reading about this fam-
ily of methods is extremely impressive. Second, it is clearly
thought through and clearly explained. It corrects several mis-
taken notions about case studies. Third, chapter 7 is the most
sensible and clear assessment of process-tracing that I have
yet read. Fourth, because it is comprehensive and clear, it of-
fers a new set of concepts for the different types of case stud-
ies and their goals and procedures, which could become a
standard set of concepts that will make it easier for us all to
debate these claims without getting tangled up in definitional
issues. So it is a very important book. It’s probably a bit too
technical for most undergraduates (although I am assigning
chapter 3 to my undergrads this semester), but it should be
required reading for graduate students, especially those in
comparative politics.
I have only a few outright disagreements with Gerring’s
arguments, and they are all about minor points. However, I do
have a more significant disagreement on matters of emphasis.
Symposium: John Gerring, Case Study Research:
Principles and Practice (Cambridge, 2007)
and Bennett discuss case studies and their relationship to
typological theories. Dul and Hak talk about case studies and
their relationship to linear probabilistic versus necessary and
sufficient condition hypotheses. All of these books also ex-
press in various ways the rapidly growing interest in mixed
and multiple methods and at the same time the need to connect
methodology more closely to theoretical concerns.
The diversity of approaches to case studies means that
there will be disagreements about core issues. The Lieshout
contribution to this newsletter illustrates a natural and posi-
tive consequence of the flowering of work on case studies.
King, Keohane and Verba devoted basically one chapter to
philosophy of science and causation issues; George and
Bennett make this topic central to their volume. Lieshout raises
important concerns about the nature of causal mechanisms
and causation in George and Bennett. In the Gerring sympo-
sium, one point raised by several contributors is the nature of
“single-outcome studies,” i.e., studies that focus on explaining
just one case. This raises the core issue of the role of case
studies in causal generalizations and the importance of this as
a goal in case study research. I suspect that this will be a con-
tinuing topic of conversation among qualitative methodolo-
gists. The Casellas essay discusses the concept of representa-
tion and its relationship to case selection and typologies. It
thus also illustrates how critical issues arise at the intersection
of different methodological approaches.
Finally, I am still planning to have a review of qualitative
methods and research design syllabi for the next issue so please
email me your syllabi or the syllabi in use at your university if
you have not done so. Thanks.
If I were writing this book (which probably violates the “mini-
mal rewrite rule” [206] because I am far less well-read than
Gerring is on this topic), I would want to be more categorical in
my judgments. It often seems that Gerring is trying too hard to
find something nice to say about every possible kind of case
study. (One exception is the “most-different cases” method,
which he effectively dismisses.) I would want to state outright
that some kinds of case study or cross-case analysis are very
useful for certain purposes but not at all for others, and some
are just not worth doing.
In particular, I would make a more rigid distinction be-
tween theory development and hypothesis testing. Gerring rec-
ognizes this distinction but does not make it stick everywhere
that it should. This problem arose, I think, because he chose to
define “case studies” in a way that makes generalization one of
their inherent purposes. A case is an element in a sample, which
is drawn from a population, he reasons, so by definition, there
is no point in doing a case study unless it generalizes to the
population in some way. Maybe the problem is that there is an
unnoticed ambiguity in the term “generalization.” It can mean
using a case to test whether a hypothesis is generally true, as
Harry Eckstein and Douglas Dion have advocated doing. This,
in my opinion, is impossible. There are no truly crucial cases in
political science due to the multicausal and probabilistic na-
ture of political phenomena, and our priors are not strong
enough to support Dion’s prescription. There is a kind of test-
ing we can do with a single case, which I will discuss below.
But usually the kind of generalization that one does in a case
study is not testing generalizations, but hypothesizing them. It
is true that the case must relate to the population to be rel-
evant, but it relates by proposing relationships that might be
generally true. But a case study cannot tell us whether they
really are generally true; that requires large-sample testing within
the whole domain in which the theory applies.
That kind of testing could be called “extensive testing.”
There is a different kind of testing, which is sometimes called
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“intensive testing,” which is ideal for case studies, but it has a
very different purpose and logic of inference. The goal of in-
tensive testing is to judge which of several competing hy-
potheses does the best job of explaining a single case. It is
therefore what Gerring discusses in the epilogue as “single-
outcome studies,” and here and there as “internal validation,”
but it doesn’t get the emphasis it deserves, because it consti-
tutes at least half of the justification for doing case studies.
Unlike extensive testing, which tests the same propositions in
a large number of cases, intensive testing tests a large number
of propositions in a single case. The logic is, “if my theory is
true, then I would expect to observe these 20 things in this
case. If the alternative theory is true, then I would expect to
observe these 20 different things. Using Bayesian logic, if the
20 predictions of my theory are confirmed and the 20 alterna-
tive predictions are not, there is only a very low probability
that my theory is wrong, and it becomes the better explanation
for this case.” It is usually impossible to quantify these prob-
abilities, but the logic behind them is very strong, and it makes
case studies a very powerful method for explaining single out-
comes.
This different emphasis would alter a few of the book’s
passages. For example, I endorse Gerring’s conclusion on p.
147 that “Case studies…rest upon an assumed synecdoche:
the case should stand for the population. If this is not true, or
if there is reason to doubt this assumption, then the utility of
the case study is brought severely into question.” I think there
are always reasons to doubt this assumption, so it is never
safe to generalize from one or a few cases. That’s why we
should use them for theory development and intensive testing
rather than for any attempt at extensive testing.
Another example: In his interesting discussion of match-
ing as a promising alternative to specifying control variables
in a regression, Gerring states that simply asserting that two
cases are more or less the same for the purpose of matching
“can be a huge advantage over large-N cross-case methods,
where each case must be assigned a specific score on all rel-
evant control variables—often a highly questionable proce-
dure, and one that must impose strong assumptions about the
shape of the underlying causal relationship.” (133–34). Yet it is
always possible to specify at least a subjective dummy vari-
able as a control, which would be exactly as accurate as assert-
ing that two cases match, and it is often possible to assign
more precise scores for regression variables. If assumptions
about the linearity of a relationship are false, they can be modi-
fied and tested. I come away convinced that matching, which
Gerring explains very clearly, is a method worth trying, but I
suspect, as I think he does, that it will not be as useful in
practice as it sounds in principle.
A final example concerns scope conditions. I love Gerring’s
call in chapter 4 (76–85) for making scope conditions explicit
and non-arbitrary; this is essential. But its implications are
ambiguous unless we make it clear what the scope conditions
demarcate. If it is tested propositions, there is little room for
arbitrariness: the scope of tested propositions is exactly as
large as the sample or the case used in the test; we can’t gen-
eralize beyond it, unless it was a random sample of sufficient
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John Gerring’s motivation for his book, Case Study Re-
search, is the same as Harry Eckstein’s writing on the same
subject three decades ago: He points out that case studies are
much maligned—the methodological doormat if you will—de-
spite their recurrence in so many influential works in our field
and throughout the social sciences. To address this conun-
drum, Gerring hopes to “restore a sense of meaning, purpose
and integrity to the case study method” (66).
And I think he largely does just that. He gives scholars
the potential to do case studies in such a way that any social
scientist could clearly see the logic through which the analy-
sis could generate strong causal inferences.
It is a vital and lucid work that ought to appear on any
graduate research methods syllabus. As much as it is a book
about case studies, it is a treatise on research design and logi-
cal thinking that updates and integrates many classic and more
recent contributions.1 The book keeps its feet on the ground
by examining a rich array of examples of completed work in
political science, often with a healthy dose of pragmatism.
In my comments, I will highlight some of the novel in-
sights found within various chapters in the book, and also
raise some issues that I think warrant some additional atten-
tion, either by Gerring, today, or by him or other scholars in the
future.
Definitional Issues
First is the question of defining the case study. If the
quest is to dignify case studies, then it is necessary to know
size, in which case we can generalize to the population. But if
we are talking about how far a hunch might travel, then the
scope of the hypothesis is hypothetical. It is essential to specu-
late about what the scope conditions may be, but we won’t
really know until some extensive testing is done.
I also have one question that is unrelated to any of this. In
chapter 6 (with Rose McDermott), which makes a beautiful,
concise argument that an experimental logic undergirds all case
studies, the most rigorous category, “Dynamic Comparison,”
is defined as having both spatial and temporal variation. I won-
der whether cross-sectional time-series analysis meets this cri-
terion.
In conclusion, I think that in reality I agree with Gerring on
just about everything and he agrees with me. I have quoted
some passages in which he seems to have an opinion different
from mine, but they are balanced by other passages that sound
very close to what I have said on these issues. If we have
differences, I believe they are only differences of emphasis.
